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Crises in our society – climate, covid-19 and mass migration – seem to define not only 
the experience of learning but also the experience of living and even surviving that in turn 
have implications for adult learning. We explore the concept of experience and examine 
whether it plays a role in addressing the need for transformative learning. Our allies in 
this task are Oskar Negt from the Frankfurt School tradition, L. A. Paul from a 
philosophical tradition and René Arcilla. Negt is useful for rethinking the role of 
experience in pedagogy. Paul helps identify the not-knowing aspect of our current 
experience and our inability to imagine how decisions translate into one’s way of living 
and being in the world. Arcilla emphasises the importance of keeping conversations 
going. Jack Mezirow’s transformation theory (relying on Habermas) informs the 
understanding of adult learning and how we can transform our way of being and living 
while facing experiences of crises and disorientation. 
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Introduction 
Early in Melville’s (1967) Moby Dick, Ishmael looks out over New York Harbour. He 
meets the moment, and indeed ours, with what he famously calls a ‘damp, drizzly 
November in my soul’ (p. 12). Extending his gaze towards the horizon he decides to 
launch out, to reach beyond the present and see the crisis as a possible new beginning. 
Ahab, the ship’s captain, frighteningly and fearlessly imposes his agenda of revenge and 
rage on the crew. The hopelessness, the greed, the anger and pain – even the lack of 
knowledge about what is really happening – are well described by Melville. It is a 
particularly powerful story as Covid-19, mass migrations, racism and climate change 
have become current crises. Many are exhausted by the efforts required, and required 
again and again. 
Our current crises are particularly challenging in not-knowing who we are 
(Eschenbacher & Fleming, 2020) and what our lives will become following these 
experiences. Is there a way back or forward? How do we think about a way out? Alanis 
Morissette (2014) says it best: ‘The only way out is through’. If there is a way forward to 
a new normal, how can this new way of being and living be imagined? Will the experience 
of crisis lead to transforming who we are and what will be considered important and 
valued? What will be learnt? Under what circumstances is rational discourse possible? 
When lives are lived, individually or collectively, with unproblematic notions of 
health and safety that become problematic through experiences of crisis, we are 
confronted with limits to what we thought we control: ourselves and our ways of living. 
These experiences may provide learning opportunities and call for transformation, 
‘rethinking deeply held, and often distorted beliefs, about who we are and our lifeworld’ 
(Finnegan, 2019, p. 46).  
Limit situations invite us to go beyond, to imagine and learn to identify hidden 
forces, submerged realities (Moby Dick) and overcome prescribed endings and closed 
solutions, to imagine, to reflect on present experiences and create breakthrough moments 
(Greene, 1973) that shatter sedimented thinking and challenge the ability to learn. In the 
current crisis, we imagine learning as offering transformative possibilities built through 
transformative conversations (Eschenbacher, 2020) to lift our drizzly Novembers.  
What, if anything, can be learnt in a crisis? In a moment of crisis, where one may 
lose one’s way in the world (Arcilla, 1995), where there is a sense of losing direction, 
there is a strong experienced need to find new directions, ones that may lead out of (or 
through) current disorientations. We may have lost what is taken for granted, including 
formerly unproblematic notions of health, freedom of movement, safety or (a sustainable) 
lifestyle. Crises today have individual, societal and even global dimensions. They leave 
people experiencing loss struggling to respond to feelings of having lost their way in the 
world. In needing to engage in a quest for new, transformed (self-)understandings, to find 
one's way again, and to navigate through crisis, the experience of disrupture provides a 
fragile ground on which to struggle with formerly unproblematic notions of health and 
ways of living together. Crises seem to demand action and may require that we short-
circuit reflection, especially critical reflection. The challenge may be to bring about both 
self-transformation and social change – to think about new thoughts that may unsettle 
fixed positions personally and socially.  
In working towards a critical pedagogy of crisis, it is appropriate to turn for a moment 
to Jürgen Habermas, on whom Mezirow relied for his critical theory of transformative 
learning. From his earliest work, Habermas (1954) shifted the traditional Marxist locus 
of crises from being an inevitable part of our current economic system (capitalism) to 
understanding capitalism as colonising the state and subverting its ability to bring the 
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economy under democratic control. Monetisation of the state and human relations, 
according to his crisis theory (1983), and the ‘dependence of late capitalism on a very 
weak legitimation basis’ have induced crises (1983, p. 38-39). The crises of the economic 
system lead to political destabilisation (Habermas, 1973, p. 195, 1975), and the 
‘monetization of the lifeworld’ is a current social pathology (1987, p. 332). This 
encourages a re-think, a redescription, as Rorty calls it (Eschenbacher, 2019; 
Eschenbacher & Fleming, 2020) and to acquire new knowledge and new frames of 
reference that may overcome not-knowing. A crisis suggests a turning point or at least a 
situation where normal frames of reference are disrupted or do not function as we wish, 
when new actions must be taken soon. Crisis and critical share the Greek root – κρίση, 
κρίσιμη, krinein - meaning the ability to discern.  
We work towards the conclusion that crisis is best understood when it is both a 
personal and social experience. To work through (Morissette, 2014) the current situation 
and search for a critical pedagogy of crisis, we focus on experience as the starting point 
for learning. This connection with experience is the major ingredient in this search for 
critical pedagogy. Pedagogy, as used here is not the equivalent to learning. Pedagogy has 
deep connections with the idea that the theory and practices of education are contested 
and powerfully influenced by history. In line with Freire, pedagogy captures the notion 
that teaching and learning are political so that curricula, textbooks, assessments and 
language used may all empower or disempower learners. Pedagogy refers to the 
understanding that education is implicated in the ways that power is held and exercised 
unequally in society. It is easier to associate pedagogy with empowering learners and 
facilitating active citizens interested in social change and social justice. Experience is a 
key concept in adult learning theory – in transformation theory, self-directed and 
experiential learning, andragogy (Irish, 2019) and most crucially in the critical pedagogy 
of Freire (1972). This paper outlines concepts useful in moving towards a critical 
pedagogy of crises: 
 
• Adult learning theory built on experience known as Mezirow’s transformation 
theory – informed by the work of Habermas – that is particularly useful for 
understanding crisis as a motivation for learning and the complexity of thinking 
required in a new world;  
• An exploration of Oskar Negt’s concept of experience as dialectical; 
• An introduction to the work of Laurie A. Paul on how challenging and difficult it 
is to imagine the transformed self and life offered by the rational decision-making 
of Mezirow and Negt; 
• Important concepts from René Arcilla on the imperative of continuing 
conversation in light of the difficulty of imagining transformations when one has 
lost one's way in the world; 
• We conclude with additional brief ideas gleaned by these authors on teaching for 
a critical pedagogy. 
 
 
On experience: Negt (and Kluge), Paul, Arcilla and Mezirow 
Oskar Negt (1971) studied philosophy and sociology with Horkheimer and Adorno at the 
Frankfurt School and is a prominent scholar at Leibniz University Hannover. Experience 
is central to his pedagogy and he has, with his colleague Alexander Kluge, a lifelong 
involvement in emancipatory worker education. Stollman (Kluge & Negt, 2014) writes 
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that ‘the rallying cry for Negt and Kluge’s work is no longer “Workers of the world, 
unite!” but rather “Experiences of the world, unite!”’ (p. 464). We adapt this to our critical 
pedagogy of crisis: ‘Crises of the world, unite!’ It is the critical theory inspired by the 
ideas of Negt on experience and pedagogy that prompt this critical pedagogy. 
L.A. Paul (2016) is Professor of Philosophy and Cognitive Science at Yale. She 
rethinks the idea of undergoing a transformative experience from a philosophical 
perspective. She provides a different perspective on the experience of crisis and is 
concerned with decision-making in the light of epistemic gaps, the ‘not-knowing’ in our 
current situation (Eschenbacher & Fleming, 2020). She identifies an inability to imagine 
how decisions will translate into one’s way of being and living in the world. She is a 
philosopher of experience. We put Paul’s (2016) work in conversation with Arcilla (1995) 
and Mezirow’s (1991) version of transformative learning. Though the theory of 
transformative learning has evolved since Mezirow’s version and now includes various 
possible routes to transformation (Stuckey, Taylor, & Cranton, 2014), our exploration 
relies on Mezirow’s version.  
René Arcilla (1995) is a Professor of Educational Philosophy at New York 
University with an interest in the philosophy of education, liberal learning, existentialism, 
and modernism. Asking 'Why Aren't Philosophers and Educators Speaking to Each 
Other?' (Arcilla, 2002), he makes space for this dialogue. We work with Arcilla's notion 
of conversational edification, as a means to developing one's selfhood through 
conversation with others as a practice that is both philosophical and educational. Arcilla's 
work allows us to build a bridge between these two practices in the face of crisis and 
disorientation. Conversational edification allows us to enter a conversation where we can 
seek to understand ourselves and develop selfhood.  
Jack Mezirow's (1991) work on transformative learning re-envisions adult learning 
in the light of crisis and disorientation. His theory of transformation (1978, 2012) is 
concerned with transformative change and has shaped the discourse on adult learning by 
adding a critical, emancipatory lens. His notion of transformative learning is concerned 
with developing selfhood and personal growth alongside social action. Mezirow is 
unwilling to favour one over the other. This tension is inherent in his theory and continues 
to provokes critique. It is a theory in progress (Mezirow and Associates, 2000). 
 
Oskar Negt: Experience and learning  
Negt works collaboratively with Kluge and his main interests include work as a source of 
identity and dignity, critical pedagogy for adults and schools, and politics. He (2008) is 
one of the few critical theorists who explicitly addresses worker (adult) education 
(Langston, 2020). Negt’s traditional Marxist views on the instrumentality of work and the 
alienation of workers are balanced by an appreciation of the positive role that work plays 
in social recognition and workers’ identities. How workers experience work is his starting 
point for learning. The experience of workers (learners) (Kluge & Negt, 2014) is infused 
with the contradictions and crises of capitalist society and acts as a source of ‘resistance 
to capitalism’ (p. 31). His concept of exemplary learning sets out how to work with 
experience by bringing a sociological imagination to bear to understanding these issues 
and fostering social action.  
Habermas appointed Negt as his assistant at the Frankfurt School in 1962. Habermas 
identifies new stages of individual and social development that involve new levels of 
learning. This learning brings new problem situations, risks and burdens. Habermas 
(1974), in a prescient moment, asserts that:   
Toward a critical pedagogy of crisis    [299] 
 
as natural scientific medicine brings a few diseases under control, there arises a 
consciousness of contingency in relation to all illness….Suffering from the contingencies 
of an uncontrolled process gains a new quality to the extent that we believe ourselves 
capable of rationally intervening in it. The suffering is then the negative of a new need… 
(p. 164) 
Though we face new crises, the experience of crises is not new. Different places in the 
world may identify different crises in their regions. Habermas (1995), in a moment of 
typical idealism, asserts that the world faced the crises of the twentieth century with 
‘enlightened perplexity’ (p. ZB4). However, he soon reverted to a more mundane 
confidence when he wrote about ‘learning from catastrophe?’ as part of coping with the 
damage done to social cohesion by ‘dismantling of the welfare state’ and ‘superpowers 
gone wild’ (Habermas, 2001, p. 47).  
The problems, dilemmas, experiences, pain and inability to mourn of many in this 
Covid era are disorientations and dislocations that may prompt learning. They may also 
allow us to build a critical understanding of how society is structured and in whose 
interests it operates in crisis. These experiences of ordinary people form the core concept 
of Negt’s pedagogy. This integrates well with the varying but parallel trajectories of both 
Habermas and Honneth. All are interested in social justice, reason, truth and democracy. 
All agree that philosophy aims at the ‘practical transformation of the existing social 
conditions’ (Habermas, 1981, p. 469). All offer a vision of the world as it might be. 
‘Democracy is the only politically conceived social order that has to be learned, over and 
over, every day, into old age’ as a ‘process of education and learning’ (Kluge & Negt, 
2014, p. 452).  
Learning utilises prior experience to construe new or revised interpretations of 
experience that in turn guide action. Experience may prompt a questioning of what has 
been taken for granted. As disorienting dilemmas (Mezirow) or perplexity (Dewey, 1966, 
p. 150; Habermas, 1995, p. ZB4) are the beginning of learning, we suggest that crises 
today form a motivation for learning. Crises are disorienting dilemmas. As the horizon of 
meanings available to people may be distorted and the range of meanings available is too 
often infused with, for example, conspiracy theories and resistance to the knowledge of 
scientific enquiry, there is a distortion in the lifeworld that complicates thinking through 
these issues.  
The lifeworld is a pool of intuitive knowledge about the objective, social and 
intersubjective world inhabited by people. It is employed, usually without thinking, to 
establish and sustain interactions. Habermas (1987, p. 126) considers the knowledge 
stored in the lifeworld to be deeply sedimented and normally unproblematic in everyday 
life. However, once the lifeworld becomes problematic, it loses its role as a background 
certainty. It becomes subject to discursive examination that is a challenge for the ability 
to critique this shared lifeworld that requires change (1987, p. 126). It seems that the 
lifeworld is in crisis (Mezirow, 1991, p. 69).  
The experience of crisis is not just an individual experience as the ‘public domain of 
the jointly inhabited interior of our lifeworld is at once inside and outside’ (Habermas, 
2008, p. 14). The inside/outside dichotomy is misleading and even in the most personal 
moments our consciousness thrives on the ‘impulses it receives from the cultural network 
of public, symbolically expressed, and intersubjectively shared categories, thoughts and 
meanings’ (Habermas, 2008, p. 15). The personal and the lifeworld are dialectically 
interconnected. It is difficult to imagine a stronger statement than this of the false 
dichotomy of individual and social, and this idea now informs this pedagogy of crisis. 
The personal is indeed political; the political is also personal and learning from experience 
necessarily involves making these connections. Learning requires an ability to perceive 
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the world in this connected way. Transformation theory does not have a good record of 
acknowledging this critical insight (Fleming, 2021). It is this insight (borrowed from 
Hegel and worked through by Habermas, Honneth and Negt) that, overall, moves this 
project towards critical pedagogy.  
Peter Alheit (2021) provides an example of this connection. Quoting Erving Goffman’s 
1977 study, he illustrates how gendered social rules influence individual actions and are 
thus reproduced across generations. According to Goffman, male/female intimate 
relations are normally of an older/taller man and younger/smaller woman. These are the 
personal choices of many. These are social and cultural constructs that are difficult to 
change and that act behind the backs of the people concerned. Here ‘the “social” breaks 
into the self-referential self-description of the psychic system, as it were, without being 
conceptually integrated’ (Alheit, 2021, p. 85). The tacit knowledge of how to act as 
gendered people operates powerfully because it does so precognitively as ‘experience 
knowledge from countless interaction situations and becomes effective to a certain extent 
in the background’ of our actions. It is experienced as beyond question and even natural 
(Alheit, 2021, p. 86). This tacit knowledge is only available where disruptions occur and 
where some event forces the participants to reflect. Crises provide such disruptions. This 
understanding that the lifeworld needs to be transformed is a shorthand way of indicating 
that questions about whether change is individual or social may miss the point that the 
answer is yes – both need to be transformed, and a change in either leads to a change in 
the other. 
Negt is under no illusion about the difficulties of such learning in these times and 
believes that ‘the ability of the emancipatory left to effect transformative change is now 
very low’ (Pohl & Hufer, 2016, p. 206). Kluge’s recent book title captures this difficulty 
and says political and social change is like slow and powerful Drilling through hard 
boards (Kluge, 2017). Pedagogy in crises is about learning how to think for one’s self in 
a world where fake news, conspiracy theories and rejection of scientific knowledge often 
dominate and undermine public discourse. This critical pedagogy of crises is an exciting 
possibility, but Negt is aware that ‘drilling through’ sounds even more challenging than 
‘working through’.  
Negt offers a new understanding of experience that transcends that of Dewey (Illeris, 
2002), for whom experience is firstly in continuity with previous experience. In search of 
meaning we modify/integrate new experiences with previous experiences. Secondly, 
experience is created by and in interaction with the broader social environment (Dewey, 
1963, p. 43). Learning involves ‘that reconstruction or reorganization of experience which 
adds to the meaning of experience, and which increases ability to direct the course of 
subsequent experience’ (Dewey, 1966, p. 76). The increase in meaning ‘corresponds to 
the increased perception of the connections and continuities of the activities in which we 
are engaged’ (Dewey, 1966, p. 76-77). Learning involves becoming aware of these 
interactions and continuities.   
Relying on Hegel, Negt goes further and asserts that these continuities and 
interactions are dialectical. This alters our understanding of learning. Learning is not just 
an adaptation or integration of experience; the process is dialectical. One’s individual 
experience cannot be properly understood unless it is seen as being in a dialectical 
relationship with broader social conditions alongside one’s previous experience. This 
reframes Honneth’s (2014) understanding of how the political and personal are 
connected. The political is personal, and they are dialectically connected. This 
reconfiguring of how one’s individual problems are dialectically connected with broader 
social issues is significant. It makes understanding the nature of one’s problem or 
dilemmas and the search for solutions more complex than understood by Mezirow (1991). 
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Indeed, without the dialectical dimension, this relationship is misconstrued. The 
experience of crises is dialectically connected to previous experience. One cannot speak 
properly of individual experience unless it is connected to broader social issues. It is 
difficult to speak of crises as individual or social. They are both. To work for the 
dialectical nature of experience is exactly what Maxine Greene proposed when she wrote 
about learning how things are connected: ‘the self can never be actualized through solely 
private experiences, no matter how extraordinary these experiences might be’ (Greene, 
1986, p. 74).  
Negt (1971) goes beyond the learning of skills and competences and understands 
‘workers existence as a social problem’ (p. 4). Individual crises are also social problems. 
His idea of learning involves workers analysing and interpreting their social situation to 
understand the causes of their current situation and to inform actions to change it. Negt 
develops a pedagogy of worker education and a teaching manual. His pedagogy (and 
social theory) is grounded in the experiences of workers. 
Negt’s pedagogy involves exercising learners’ sociological imagination so that both 
their lived experiences and the possibilities that may emerge are (re)imagined. What he 
calls exemplary learning is connected to the interests of learners; connects the experiences 
of learners with broader social issues and is relevant for emancipation (Negt, 1971, p. 97). 
This is a rare excursion into adult learning theory and practice by a Frankfurt School 
scholar.  
Learning is not just accumulating knowledge; it is a collective journey of self-
determination that includes taking political and emancipatory actions. Negt supports a 
curriculum or list of competences that are essential for exemplary learning. The topics 
taught by Negt (2010) include these six competences: identity competence; historical 
competence; social justice competence; technological competence; ecological 
competence and economic competence (p. 218-234). This links learners’ individual 
experiences (of injustices) with broader social issues and explores the interconnections to 
see how individual experiences and structural issues are connected dialectically. Zeuner 
(2013) refers to this as meta-learning, and it underpins the six competences (p. 148). 
Along with dialectical thinking, this is fundamentally important for exemplary learning 
(Negt, 1993, p. 661). This is also part of the process of our proposed understanding of 
learning in a critical pedagogy. 
A pedagogy of crises involves thinking independently, dialectically, systemically, 
with sociological imagination, utilising critical reflection and democratic participation. 
Negt (1973) describes adult learning as an analysis that brings into awareness the 
historical development of how learners’ interests are defined for them and how 
relationships of power are experienced, such that they can discover through learning the 
roles they play in society and through study identify options, including actions, that will 
change their unjust reality. This pushes learning theory into social and political arenas, 
and this Negt-inspired critical pedagogy of crises provides a framework for an historical 
and material interpretation of subjectivity as produced by the capitalist system as well as 
a source for a new social order that will be just and caring (Kluge & Negt, 2014).  
Negt and Kluge (1993) assert that experience is the most important thing that workers 
actually produce (p. xlviii). Illeris (2002) states this best: ‘The working class can break 
through the distortion of immediate experiences, experience the structural conditions for 
their experiential development, and then fight to change these conditions’ (p. 152). When 
we understand how experience is influenced by social structures, there is then the 
possibility of what Maxine Greene (1995) calls breaking-through the inertia of 
convention when people ‘are enabled to explain their “shocks” and reach beyond’ (p. 39). 
Such a pedagogy, Greene continues, ‘offers life; it offers hope; it offers the prospect of 
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discovery; it offers light’ (p. 133). These moments can help transcend limits and engage 
one’s sociological imagination in the process of exemplary learning and social 
transformation (Negt, 1971; Negt & Kluge, 1993).  
These ideas are not new to adult educators such as Olesen (1989), Wildemeersch (1992) 
and Illeris (2002). Olesen (1989), quoting Negt, sees ‘experience as a collective process 
because when we experience as individuals we also do so through a socially structured 
consciousness’ (p. 8) or again ‘the socialized individual cannot experience individually’ 
(p. 68). The individual is always multiple, or as Brecht calls it, ‘the self is always plural’ 
or dividual (cited in Kluge & Negt, 2014, p. 45). These connections are made to extend 
the links between the central role of experience in any learning and our critical pedagogy 
of crises.  
Both Negt and Paul place experience at the centre of their work and are concerned 
with transformation but Paul offers an alternative point of view that allows us to explore 
more thoroughly the experience of crisis in a learning situation.  
 
L.A. Paul on transformative experience 
We make sense of what life throws at us as we 'shape a coherent meaning out of the raw 
material of our outer and inner experiencing' (Kegan, 2000, p. 52). We still need to know 
more about what makes the experience of a crisis a potential prompt for learning. Paul's 
(2016) work is useful here as she refers to transformative experiences that epistemically 
and personally alter our meaning making. It is like Kegan’s ‘metaprocess that affects the 
very terms of our meaning-constructing’ (Kegan, 2000, p. 52). Transformative 
experiences confront us with the basic unknowability of our subjective futures in a context 
where new and dramatic changes are emerging, and transformative decision-making 
draws out the consequences of that epistemic fact. In an important sense, when facing a 
transformative choice, we lack the knowledge needed to have authority and control over 
who we will become when choosing how to act (Paul, 2016, p. 110). It seems as if 
experiences may indeed be transformative and confront us with an unknowability of 
subjective and collective futures regarding transformative choices. Paul is an important 
break on the confidence invested in rational thinking through future possibilities, as 
outlined by Negt (and by Mezirow). 
Can we learn from such experiences? They might teach us to humble ourselves, 
facing the limits of established ways of making decisions for ourselves – individually and 
collectively – by weighing arguments rationally while being forced to accept an epistemic 
deficit. The new emerging identity, a consequence of significant change, is not knowable 
before it emerges. This experience leads us to wonder how to handle crises regarding 
experiences that may change us, asking, 'Will you be able to recast what life throws, and 
has thrown, at you in your own terms?' (Arcilla, 1995, p. 99). What does this mean for 
learners?  
Experiences force us to make decisions that we may yet be unable to make. This 
provides both an opportunity and a necessity to learn transformatively (e.g. Mezirow, 
1991, 2012). Is the theory of transformative learning useful for understanding this? Yes 
and no. Yes, as this theory captures the phenomenon of transformation as adults learn in 
the light of existential crises and disorienting dilemmas, often in ways that have been 
unimaginable before. Disorienting dilemmas are crises. No, as this only partly addresses 
the transformative experiences we are currently facing. It does not adequately answer the 
question of how to make transformative decisions: In this specific case, we experience a 
process of transformation that will change us epistemically and personally. It does not 
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allow decisions to be made by weighing arguments rationally because of the lack of 
relevant knowledge available as part of the process of thinking through. How can we 
choose a future when formerly taken-for-granted ways of being are questioned, and the 
future remains largely unknown. Paul continues: ‘Just at the point where we must decide 
how to navigate from the present to the future using our first personal perspective, we are 
confronted by the impossibility of assigning subjective values to future outcomes’ (2016, 
p. 108). 
Mezirow's highly rational version of transformative learning promotes discourse 
based on weighing arguments to make informed decisions. What if we cannot make 
informed decisions because we simply cannot weigh arguments and assess their viability 
because it is impossible to know future outcomes?   
[T]he problem is that when you face a transformative choice, that is, a choice of whether to 
undergo an epistemically and personally transformative experience, you cannot rationally 
make this choice based on what you think the transformative experience will be like. That 
is, you cannot rationally choose to have the experience, nor can you rationally choose to 
avoid it, to the extent that your choice is based on your assessments of what the experience 
would be like and what this would imply about the subjective value of your future lived 
experience. (Paul, 2016, p. 18-19)  
Paul (2016) sharpens our perspective on the limits of (transformative) learning theory 
facing these kinds of crises: 
You can't navigate these decisions by stepping back, rationally evaluating your different 
subjective possibilities, and then choosing the act that maximizes the expected subjective 
values of your future lived experience. (…) Instead, you grope forward in deep subjective 
ignorance of what your future conscious life will be like. (p. 110) 
Having to grope forward having lost one's way in the world is of concern. Finding 
possible ways forward is at the heart of transformative learning theory. It involves 
challenging and critical questioning and assessing the integrity of deeply held 
assumptions about how learners ‘relate to the world around them' (Mezirow & Taylor, 
2009, p. xi). Mezirow’s perspective transformation (Mezirow, 1991) involves doing 
exactly what Paul (2016) says is impossible: to step back and become aware of formerly 
unproblematic assumptions that provide grounds for one's way of being and living.  
Through engaging in a critical process of reflecting and ultimately changing one's 
assumptive clusters, adults develop and grow towards a more inclusive and integrative 
perspective providing grounds for making decisions and living one's life. It can best be 
described as an ‘epiphanic, or apocalyptic, cognitive event - a shift in the tectonic plates 
of one's assumptive clusters’ (Brookfield, 2000, p. 139). An experience of disrupture 
(Alheit, 2021) is the starting point for learning: 'When our meaning perspectives are 
questioned, the coherence-producing mechanism of our minds is interrupted (emphasis 
in original). We are no longer able to interpret the situation based on our previous 
experiences' (Mälkki, 2019, p. 64). The road to transformation in the light of these 
disruptive experiences is rational discourse, according to Mezirow (1991), who relies on 
Habermas (1987) for these ideas. Rational discourse  
is that specialized use of dialogue devoted to searching for a common understanding and 
assessment of the justification of an interpretation or belief. This involves assessing reasons 
advanced by weighing the supporting evidence and arguments and by examining alternative 
perspectives. Reflective discourse involves a critical assessment of assumption. (Mezirow, 
2012, p. 78) 
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Mezirow names several conditions that need to be met to realise discourse, such as 
accurate and complete information and the ability to weigh evidence objectively. It is 
exactly these preconditions for discourse that cannot be met, according to Paul, when 
choices are faced in a crisis.  
When one’s experience is of having lost one’s way and current self-understanding is 
under question, the need to find oneself and one’s way in the world again becomes a 
major concern. Paul (2016) argues that there are possible ways through: 
you must choose to have or to avoid transformative experiences based largely on revelation: 
you decide whether you want to discover how your life will unfold given the new type of 
experience. If you choose to undergo a transformative experience and its outcomes, you 
choose the experience for the sake of discovery itself, even if this entails a future that 
involves stress, suffering, or pain. (p. 129) 
Or, in a nutshell, 'the best response to this situation is to choose based on whether we want 
to discover who we'll become' (Paul, 2016, p. 4).  
It seems as if answers can be found only after having lived through disruptive experiences. 
These are what Paul (2016) calls transformative experiences because they are ‘both 
epistemically and personally transformative. Having a transformative experience teaches 
you something new, something that you could not have known before having the 
experience, while also changing you as a person' (p. 3).  
What would it mean, then, to undergo a transformative experience? You know that 
‘undergoing the experience will change what it is like for you to live your life, and perhaps 
even change what it is like to be you, deeply and fundamentally' (Paul, 2016, p. 3). 
Learning, especially learning with a promised deadly outcome (as Paul calls it), is risky, 
and outcomes are not guaranteed. The key to our critical pedagogy of crisis is the 
experience of crisis itself and how it is worked through by learners. Knowing what we 
now know, one wonders why anyone will start a transformative journey. 
 
René V. Arcilla on making the conversations last 
In searching for a more satisfying answer, we turn to René V. Arcilla (1995) who 
articulates how edifying conversations (Rorty) can be undertaken that are rational, aim at 
self-understanding and build on experience. Transformative learning offers another 
dimension to this process, where the learner's way of being and knowing, 'the form itself 
[is] at risk of change (and not just change but increased capacity)’ (Kegan, 2000, p. 49). 
We recall the previous discussion prompted by Alheit and Goffman, where self is not an 
isolated (from the social context) entity. This idea of self-formation remains central when 
'we choose to become the kind of person - without knowing what that will be like - that 
these experiences will make us into' (Paul, 2016, p. 123). It allows us to take responsibility 
for our own learning, essentially owning it. Only by owning it, we can recast what life 
presents and has thrown at us (Arcilla, 1995). This kind of learning is multi-layered; it 
holds the tension between being dangerous, terrifying and liberating at the same time. 
Radical questioning, according to Bernstein (2016), may be  
terrifying because it means giving up the familiar banisters and guidelines that we normally 
accept in orienting our lives; dangerous because, when such questioning is truly radical, it 
seems to leave us with nothing; liberating (emphases in original) because it frees us from 
illusions and enables us to confront our subjectivity and inwardness without illusions. (p. 
121) 
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Why and when would it make sense to engage in this kind of (learning) process? What 
opportunities do transformative choices hold? Why should one learn transformatively, 
having already lost one’s way in the world? Arcilla (1995) responds: 'What motivates 
your efforts to learn is the desire for self-knowledge. Yet what if the others to whom you 
turn have no way of directly revealing you to yourself; what if they are equally searching 
for themselves?' (p. 6). Bernstein's nothing becomes something through the process of 
discovering who we will become, as a possibility and necessity of learning.  
Transformative experiences provide us with opportunities to understand that 'the 
various self-conceptions you take for granted do not form a coherent whole' (Arcilla, 
1995, p. 6). They provide the fragile ground for searching for a new (self-)understanding. 
As we have seen earlier, Covid-19, systematic racism and violence alongside climate 
change hold two dimensions at their heart: an individual and a societal, global dimension. 
All of these crises, as different as they might be in different places, reflect what Mezirow 
(1978) describes as distinctive elements and prerequisites for a transformation learner 
who 'comes to identify her personal problem as a common one and a public issue' (p. 15). 
It is this connection that allows the learner to progress and bridge the divide between 
individual and social learning. Personal projects of self-actualisation and development as 
well as social action are possible outcomes of Mezirow's transformative learning. To 
categorise issues as either individual or social and to see learning as also divided in this 
way may be a false dichotomy. The desire to return to normal, as many desire in the 
present crisis, may hinder or foreclose transformative change.  
When transformative learning theory places such an emphasis on rational discourse, 
as Mezirow did, we ask, where can we go from here? Can Mezirow's notion of rational 
discourse be sustained when, as we have just seen, it lacks important features that would 
provide the kind of context for engaging in a constructive way with transformative 
experiences and decisions? Mezirow’s theory already omits the dialectic nature of 
experience. We might also have to add another dimension to transformative learning. It 
needs a different kind of dialogue, one that is less concerned with exchanging arguments 
and dedicated to providing a safe (enough) space for adults to struggle constructively with 
transformative experiences. If we cannot engage in a dialogue that requires us to step back 
from our experiences and weigh arguments about how to proceed from where we are, we 
need to extend transformative learning theory as we presently know it.  
We suggest adding a different kind of dialogue, one that has been introduced as 
transformative conversation (Eschenbacher, 2020). It holds many of the same features as 
Arcilla's (1995) notion of edifying conversation and adds a transformative dimension to 
it. Instead of attempting to arrive at a tentative consensus, as Mezirow (1991, 2012) 
suggests through rational discourse, Arcilla proposes a different pathway, highlighting a 
different, important dimension. As adults are in need of  
each other to help them rediscover a sense of self-direction which they must nevertheless 
claim for themselves. Hence they have recourse to conversation, to an exploratory, 
associative, open-ended, tolerant exchange of intimations free from the demand that it issue 
in conclusions binding on all. (Arcilla, 1995, p. 7) 
The idea of edification is closely tied to autobiography and becomes especially helpful 
for individuals struggling with the kinds of transformative decisions that force them to 
choose whether they want to discover who they will become after the transformative 
experience.  
Arcilla's (1995) notion of edifying conversation seems to address many of the 
requirements for making these transformative choices: 'As we edify ourselves in response 
to events that befall us (…) we develop our ability to weave contingent but consistent 
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stories of the course of our own lives' (Arcilla, 1995, p. 100). Arcilla (1995) continues: 
‘the hope of agreement is never lost as long as the conversation lasts’ (p. 74). Moreover, 
following Rorty’s conversational conception of reason, Arcilla outlines more interesting 
and productive ways of speaking about ourselves. The task of reasonable conversations 
is to edify ourselves – to have conversational edification. It may be that Arcilla, in a way 
that is profoundly significant for this fragmented moment in history, has argued 
successfully for an anti-antagonistic conversation adding to his Rorty-inspired edifying 
conversation.  
Translating his idea of edifying conversation into the debate about transformative 
learning (Eschenbacher, 2020) leaves us with a new direction for the theory itself. This 
provides sufficient space for a Habermasian notion of discourse where we have access to 
necessary information and possible outcomes, as well as a notion of transformative 
conversations where we lack epistemic access and cannot perceive possible outcomes, as 
the future remains unknown. Building on our own common vulnerabilities and the many 
things about which we are unsure (especially in a crisis), we can take the risky step of 
leaving home and experiencing how ‘we are all strangers to ourselves, together cast into 
an unfamiliar unheimlich home’ (p. 151). The concept of transformative edifications we 
suggest is redefined as transformative conversations (Eschenbacher, 2020).  
 
Implications for teaching a critical pedagogy of crises 
Previously, we identified some implications for teaching, as it is a challenge to discuss 
pedagogy without discussing teaching. According to Negt, a curriculum of competencies 
and exemplary learning are practical ways in which a pedagogy of crises may be made 
real in learning environments. Negt (and Kluge) systematically present materials and 
suggestions as to how their ideas might be utilised in learning situations (Kluge & Negt, 
2014; Negt & Kluge, 1993). They use science fiction and a range of innovative materials 
to support and enhance the critical intelligence of learners (Negt & Kluge, 1993, p. 106). 
Negt’s contribution to understanding adult learning also includes the concepts of 
exemplary learning and societal competencies. Negt (1971) builds on the interdisciplinary 
method of C. Wright Mills that illuminates ‘structural relationships between individual 
life histories, immediate interests, wishes, hopes and historical events’ (p. 28). As we 
navigate crises, these connections are the connective tissue of learning. 
When learning is discussed in times of crisis, whether thinking of struggling with a 
global pandemic, racism or climate change, we benefit from extending transformative 
learning by adding this further conversational format. In edifying conversations, learners 
can engage as fellow conversationalists 'in questioning themselves before taking things 
for granted, in order to receive their being at a loss as a present' (Arcilla, 1995, p. 2). It is 
an attitude that invites adult learners to adopt a certain attitude, one where answers about 
how to best tackle transformative experiences can remain unknown and outcomes remain 
unclear. It also allows us – pushing our idea through – to choose that we want to discover 
the adult learners we will become by undergoing transformative experiences.  
All the allies in this exploration are interested in pedagogy and the implications of 
their ideas for teaching. Using science fiction, satire, fragments of literature, film and 
documentaries Negt alongside Paul encourages dangerous thoughts of critical 
intelligence. Kluge and Negt (2014) collect a visual archive of pedagogical methods for 
facilitating the exploration of how things could be different (p. 260). Kluge’s book title 
names this pedagogy: Learning processes with a deadly outcome (Kluge, 1996). In this 
way, they are remarkably in step with previous Frankfurt School members and yet 
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surprisingly different too. Paul (2016, p. 1), for example, adds an imaginative pedagogy 
when she asks her readers to ‘imagine becoming a vampire’ as her introduction to her 
study of transformative experiences. Her methodology is every bit as unusual as Negt and 
Kluge.  
Arcilla's (1995) notion of (liberal) learning is inspired by several aspects Oakeshott 
(1989, p. 41) identified as distinctive, as an 'invitation to disentangle oneself, for a time, 
from the urgencies of the here and now and to listen to the conversation in which human 
beings forever seek to understand themselves'. Arcilla (1995) suggests joining the 
conversation instead of just listening to it. But what is it that makes the idea to join so 
attractive? It 'is the recognition that your sense of yourself leaves something to be desired' 
(Arcilla, 1995, p. 3) – especially in times of crisis and disorientation. 
 
Conclusion 
A critical pedagogy of crises continues to evolve as does the task of making further links 
and connections, whether through Negt, Paul, Arcilla or others, so that a fuller and more 
satisfying iteration of a theory of learning might unfold to meet the increasingly 
challenging learning dilemmas faced by individuals, communities and society. There is 
urgency in the task and risk. It may be that not-knowing becomes the new normal, and 
the pursuit of rational certainty emerging from rational discourse or conversations may 
not be entirely possible.  
As rational conversations are the domain of critical theory (Habermas) and 
transformative learning (Mezirow), one may also have to attend to the challenges of this 
pedagogic task. In addition, as experience is the ground on which learning theory builds, 
there is another challenge that involves understanding that experience is a more fertile 
basis for learning. The dialectical nature of experience allows us to view a current 
emphasis on subjectivity as in need of further elaboration. The philosophical objections 
of Paul or the power of continuing transformative conversations of Arcilla may provide 
ideas that could sustain learning in crises that are not just ahead but already part of our 
experience. This is the state of this search that is attempting to move towards a critical 
pedagogy of crises.  
It may be the case that we can imagine ourselves (metaphorically) standing on the 
Pequod in Moby Dick. In that moment, like the crew, we know very little. We gather what 
knowledge and learning we can and together process it with edifying conversations as 
much as with rational discourse so that together social action, real change, and real 
transformations are not only possible but pursued relentlessly but with anti-antagonistic 
solidarity. What can be offered in contrast to this solidarity? We do know that Ahab alone 
can do nothing, or very little.  
Ishmael in Moby Dick spends a night sharing a bed with Queequeg, a cannibal (p. 
28), but in the morning, following their conversations, he thinks this man is ‘worth 
unusual regarding’ (p. 34). When a short while later Queequeg is prevented from boarding 
the ship because he is not a Christian, Ishmael speaks on his behalf saying he is a Christian 
and belongs to the same Church ‘to which you and I, … and all of us, and every mother’s 
son and soul of us belong; the great and everlasting First Congregation of this whole 
worshipping world; we all belong to that;…in that we all join hands’(p. 83). 
It may be a shared humanity and solidarity that will be the basis for working through 
our current existential crises; however, they are named and experienced. In the end, 
Ishmael is in an untenable position, left alone, the only survivor of the entire adventure. 
He alone survives to tell the terrible and tragic tale. A lone survivor is not tenable. Or, in 
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the words of Kurantowicz, Olesen and Wildemeersch (2014), ‘a human being is a human 
being is a human being is a human being’ (p. 145).  
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